Thi Thu Linh Bui ,2017, Foreign Policy Analysis
Introduction
With the view that the United States (US) foreign policy is of exceptionalism, US is one of the powerful countries in the international system tending to intervene in the civil conflicts around the world. [1] By a quantitative analysis covering US interventions across 58 years from 1945 to 2002, Mullenbach and Matthews argued that the impacts of international factors are more important than that of internal factors on the US intervention choices, and that the impacts of both kinds of factor may vary depending on the kind of intervention and the time period. [2] The Syrian Crisis, which has started from March 2011 and has become a significantly troubled magnet attracting numerous interventional coalitions going along with their political and military intentions, is not out of US interventionism. This Civil War has been fallen into two presidential terms of Obama (2009-present) who prefers a diplomatic solution than a military solution in foreign policy, [3] however, in fact, US has occurred in the Crisis in both participatory and military interventions. Given the complexity and uncertainty of international system in the modern world as well as some Obama’s domestics successes such as healthcare system, economic recovery, and the creation of more perfect union, [4] the international factors, again, have played a crucial role in the Syrian intervention game. Also, Obama government using many types of intervention means that there was a poliheuristic decision making on the policy formulation. This paper, therefore, aims to address the international factors motivating the US government’s decision to involve in the Syrian Crisis namely the ideological and geopolitical influences, and to analyze the poliheuristic decision making of Obama to choose type of intervention in the Crisis.
Literature Review
The definition of intervention relates closely to the concept of sovereignty. In a published report in 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) defined the definition of “humanitarian intervention”, the currently popular and legalistic concept of intervention in international relation, that if a sovereignty state was not able to protect its citizens, it should be a responsibility of international community to protect, even the need for external intervention. [5] However, there are no criteria for “humanitarian intervention” in Syria in the early period of the Crisis; “humanitarian intervention” is actually a pretext which can not explain the underlying motivations of US involvement.[6] This study adopts the definition used by Mullenbach and Matthews that intervention is “diplomatic, economic, or military involvement by a third party in a political dispute between two states, or two groups within a state, for the purpose of assisting one of the parties to prevail in the dispute (participatory or partisan intervention) or for the purpose of assisting both parties to manage or resolve the dispute without taking sides (intermediary or nonpartisan intervention)”.[7] In the context of an intrastate dispute, participatory intervention is seen as the presence of an external party to support of or oppose to one of the parties such as military assistance and economic sanction, while military intervention is the mobilization or use of military force.[8] Basing on these concepts, the occurrence of US in the Syrian Crisis was divided into two period: (1) the participatory intervention in which US has supported the Syrian opposition groups to delegitimize Assad government from the early beginning of the Crisis March 2011 to September 2014 (when American-led International Coalition conducted precision air strikes in Syria), and (2) the military intervention from September 2014 to present.
The US government argued that US has intervened in the Syrian Crisis because of five reasons: (1) to require Assad resignation; (2) to remove Syria’s chemical weapons material; (3) to participate in negotiations with the opposition; (4) to provide Syrian citizen humanitarian assistances; and (5) to defeat the Islamic State (IS).[9] Is this the true story? Not only international community but also public and policy agendas in US are still incredulous that which one is the actual cause, or it may be other crucial motivations in this intervention.
The previous study maintained that the main international reasons of US participatory intervention after World War II were ideological linkage, humanitarian linkage, non-democracy, ethnic linkage, and adversary intervention. Meanwhile, US more likely interfered militarily in other sovereignty states under the influences of ideological linkage, humanitarian linkage, non-democracy, and geographic proximity reasons. [10] Regarding the US foreign policy towards Syria since the early 2000s to 2013 which covered both Bush and Obama Administrations, Karakoç highlighted the effect of ideological factors. [11] Collectively, rather than the humanitarian justification or the reasons as US’s statements, the US intervention in the Syrian Crisis is explained by another international factors.
On the other hand, the poliheuristic theory argues that policy makers use a two-stage decision process which are: (a) rejecting alternative choices that are unacceptable to the policy maker on a critical dimension or dimensions and (b) choosing an alternative choice from the remaining alternatives while maximizing benefits and minimizing risks.[12] Prior to Obama, poliheuristic theory affected Clinton to decide using force in Kosovo in 1999[13] as well as Carter to implement the hostage rescue mission in Iran in 1979.[14] Obama, indeed, changed the involvement plan from participatory to military intervention in the Syrian Crisis. It is suggested that the international factors were not enough to explain Obama’s intervention decisions, the poliheuristic theory should be exploited to understand the mechanism of Obama’s decision making.
The Concurrence of Ideological and Geopolitical Influences
Ideological Influences
The US foreign policy towards the Syrian Crisis has been influenced by the orientalism and neoconservative ideology. Orientalism was developed by Said in 1979. He defined that the Orient is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior, and inevitable; and should be either to be feared or controlled.[15] Meanwhile, sharing the same idea with realists, neoconservative takes the view that the world is dangerous and uncertain, however, rather than competing with the other states to seek for power and security as realists, a state under neoconservative engages in the fight between the good and evil.[16] Under the influences of orientalism and neoconservative, the Middle East where has been claimed as the most prolific terrorist area is the nest of evil and must be controlled, particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attack. As a combination of realism and altered democratic-peace theory, neoconservative has forced US to call for the counterterrorism and democracy translation in the Middle East from the 2000s.
Since Syria is one of pivotal of states in the Middle East, the annual US reports called Patterns of Global Terrorism released from 2001 to 2011 had claimed that Assad government has supported for terrorism.[17] Also, even though Israel which is Syria’s neighbor and US’s ally is more potentially dangerous than Syria in terms of military capacity and nuclear weapons, US government blamed that “Syria’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs threaten the security of the Middle East and the national security interests of the United States”.[18] As an unyielding dictatorship state, Assad’s regime has challenged the liberal democracy norm and foreign policy of US in the Middle East. Therefore, Syria’s regime should be punished; overthrowing Assad and regime change are seen as the ultimate neoconservative targets of US in Syria.[19]
Geopolitical Influences
Syria is one of the crucial countries in the Middle East in opposition to US and its allies. Syria has borders and some conflicts in history with Turkey and Israel, US’s main allies in this area. Also, Turkey is the favorite destination of the Syrian refugees and opposition group. By contrast, Syria government sets up the close relationship with Shiite Iran government and the Lebanese Shiite movement of Hezbollah Lebanon. Because Iran competes with Saudi Arabia, Syria becomes the proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran.[20] With a foreign policy shaping by the anti-Iranian, Sunni-based, and Israel-biased perspective,[21] it is the evident truth that US wants to realign Syria’s political position.
Also, US could not ignore the Russian influences in the Middle East. Although Obama attempted to improve the relationship with Russia which was faded since the end of the Cold War, the changes in Putin’s foreign policy to increase Russian influences and to be taken into account in the international relation required Obama to pay attention.[22] It is different to the conflict in Iraq in 2003 that Russia stayed out of the war, Putin government has had the willingness to support Assad government to seek for state’s interests in the Middle East.[23] Prior to the Crisis, Russia supplied Assad government with weapons and military advisers as well as together with China officially opposed US to support Assad government at the international level.[24] If US ignored the Syrian Crisis or just simply used diplomatic solutions which also mean “do-nothing”, it was Russia’s opportunity to confirm its influences and powers in the Middle East.
Actually, US implemented “do-nothing” policy in the Arab Spring and the consequences of the Arab Spring showed US’s failures in this area.[25] It was unsurprising that the complicated relationships of Syria made Obama reluctant to execute the military intervention. However, after the Arab Spring which erodes the US influences in the Middle East and given the adversary intervention, US intervention in Syria was necessary to reassure the US supports towards its allies and confirms its powers in this area.
Furthermore, the intervention in the Syrian Crisis contributes to organizing a new world order following US arrangement. The Syria’s geopolitical position is affected by two sides: the right side consists of US, the European Union, Canada, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt; the left side is led by Russia, China, and Iran. As Syria belonged to the left side before the Crisis, it was the target of US and its allies to change Syria to the left side through the Crisis.[26] “Regime change would be a victory for the unipolar new world order and a defeat for a potential multi-polar new world order. Regime change permits the birth of the “new” Middle East while reform may actually kill it. The people of Syria and their freedom are irrelevant to the plan.”[27] It was US’s original motivation to intervene in the Syrian Crisis that the solutions for the Crisis managed by US would make a better world order for US.
From the systematic view of the orientalism and neoconservative ideology, it is US who planned the participatory and military intervention to punish Syria government and control this regime.
Obama’s Poliheuristic Decision Making
Under the influences of ideological and geopolitical factors, when the unrest started in Syria in March 2011, US government had some policy alternatives to consider: (1) do-nothing, (2) using diplomatic solution to require Assad government to reform, (3) participatory intervention by supporting the opposition groups and using its allies to intervene in Syria, (4) air strike, (5) setting up no fly zone, and (6) ground troop.
In the first stage, although Obama is a kind of diplomatic person, do-nothing or diplomatic solution was unaccepted. The relationship between the right and the left sides showed that do-nothing or diplomatic solution simply stayed out of the Crisis. It would be the signs of US’s weakness in the international relation comparing to the left side. Also, it was impossible to wait for a regime change from the “reformer” Assad. For a ground troop, it could not only cause high costs and casualties but also face an international criticism. Obama understood the high risks of a mass invasion which he himself had to solve for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, the US planners considered three intervention options: participatory intervention, air strike, and setting up no fly zone.
Obama had a bundle of participatory and military intervention in the second stage. However, US did not have a convincing reason, even the humanitarian justification, to start any form of military intervention in the beginning of the unrest. Therefore, he determined to apply participatory intervention and announced a “red line” for military intervention.
Under the form of participatory involvement, Obama government used its allies in the Middle East and Syrian opposition groups to confront with Assad government. As soon as the unrest grew in March 2011, US has isolated the Assad government by publicly supporting the Syrian opposition groups and forcing Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel which are US’s allies in the Middle East to isolate Syria’s membership in the Arab League.[28] Twice in late 2011, the leaders of Washington, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton, stated the delegitimization of Assad government. Basing the pretext that Assad’s government deployed chemical weapons against opponents and civilian, US confirmed the necessary for US intervention in 2012, 2013, and 2014. The occurrence of external factors, as a consequence, made the Civil War worse.
Obama government faced the challenges of the ineffective participatory intervention and the rise of IS. He had remaining two alternative choices in the second stage, therefore, it was the time for military intervention. In order to shift to military intervention in 2015, US government announced to protect US, US’s allies, and the Syrian citizen from the threats of terrorists. Also, it was the “red line” of resignation which the Assad government did not follow, as the US’s statement. Finally, US decided to set up the no-fly zone and directly lead its international coalitions to conduct airstrikes targeting both IS and Assad’s military. Of course, when US decided to use military force in Syria, US could not imagine that the situation in Syria became worse after 6 years because of the widespread influences of IS, the ineffectiveness of its military intervention and its supports for opposition groups, and the effective military intervention of Russia.
Discussion and Conclusion
The intervention of US in the Syrian Crisis was influenced by the orientalism, neoconservative ideology and Syrian geopolitical factor in international relation. Under the influences, US’s goals are to punish Assad government and force political change in Syria to seek for a new world order. Also, the poliheuristic theory affected Obama government to decide the forms of intervention which were participatory, air strikes and setting up no-fly zone.
This paper agrees with Khashanah's argument that ideological and geopolitical dimensions shaped the Syrian Crisis.[29] The findings confluence with the study of Mullenbach and Matthews to prove the role of international factors in US intervening decision in which ideological linkage again partly contributes to US involvement in a civil conflict.[30] Also, two stages in decision making confirm the effect of the poliheuristic theory in American foreign policy as opinions of Redd[31] and Brule[32].
Obama left the White House in the midst of continuing conflicts in Syria. The relationships among the right side, the left side, and the “third side” IS become worse. The deeply military intervention of Russia has changed the situation of the Crisis and has affected significantly the US intervention, therefore, future study should exploit the triangle relationship of Russia-US-Syria government within this Crisis.
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[1] K Holsti, “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is It Exceptional?,” Kalevi Holsti: A Pioneer in International Relations, 2016, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-26624-4_10.
[2] Mullenbach, Mark J., and Gerard P. Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes,” International Interactions 34, no. 1 (2008): 25, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050620701878835
[3] Bentley, Michelle, and Jack Holland, eds. “Introduction,” The Obama Doctrine: A Legacy of Continuity in US Foreign Policy? (Routledge, 2016) :2, at https://books.google.co.jp/books?hl=en&lr=lang_en|lang_ja&id=bG3ADAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA164&dq=US%2BRussia%2BSyria&ots=lpcJLVTORD&sig=MUDyN_I6o89VZ14yLrK3W7mrijw#v=onepage&q=US%2BRussia%2BSyria&f=false
[4] Ibid., 2.
[5] The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 2001, 69, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf
[6] Khaldoun Khashanah, “The Syrian Crisis: A Systemic Framework,” Contemporary Arab Affairs 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 5, accessed November 4, 2016, doi:10.1080/17550912.2014.881006.
[7] Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes,” 49.
[8] Ibid., 34.
[9] Blanchard , Christopher M., Carla E. Humud, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin. “Armed conflict in Syria: overview and US response.” Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional Research Service, 2014, 33, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA610717.
[10] Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes.”
[11] Karakoç, Jülide. “US Policy Towards Syria Since the Early 2000s.” Critique 41, No. 2 (2013): 223, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03017605.2013.805005.
[12] A Mintz, “How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2004, 6-7, accessed December 7, 2016, at http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/48/1/3.short.
[13] SB Redd, “The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo,” International Studies Perspectives, 2005, accessed December 7, 2016, at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00198.x/full.
[14] DJ Brulé, “Explaining and Forecasting Leaders’ Decisions: A Poliheuristic Analysis of the Iran Hostage Rescue Decision,” International Studies Perspectives, 2005, accessed December 7, 2016, at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1528-3577.2005.00196.x/full.
[15] Edward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 300.
[16] Patricia Owens, “Beyond Strauss, Lies, and the War in Iraq: Hannah Arendt’s Critique of Neoconservatism,” Review of International Studies 33, no. 2 (2007): 266, accessed November 8, 2016, doi:10.1017/.
[17] Karakoç, “US Policy Towards Syria Since the Early 2000s.”
[18] “D1. U.S. Congress, Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (Pl 108-175), Washington, 12 December 2003,” Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 3 (2004): 2487, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1525/jps.2004.33.3.176.pdf
[19] Mir H. Sadat and Daniel B. Jones, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Syria: Balancing Ideology and National Interests,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 2 (June 2009): 96, accessed November 8, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2009.00393.x.
[20] Pierre M. Atlas, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,” Digest of Middle East Studies 21, no. 2 (November 2012): 374, accessed November 8, 2016, doi:10.1111/j.1949-3606.2012.00158.x.
[21] Karakoç, “US Policy Towards Syria Since the Early 2000s.”
[22] Maxine David, “US-Russia Relation in Obama’s second term: A damage limitation exercise,” The Obama Doctrine: A Legacy of Continuity in US Foreign Policy? (Routledge, 2016) :164, accessed November 8, 2016, at https://books.google.co.jp/books?hl=en&lr=lang_en|lang_ja&id=bG3ADAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA164&dq=US%2BRussia%2BSyria&ots=lpcJLVTORD&sig=MUDyN_I6o89VZ14yLrK3W7mrijw#v=onepage&q=US%2BRussia%2BSyria&f=false
[23] N Kozhanov, “Russian-Syrian Dialogue: Myths and Realities,” The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2014, accessed November 4, 2016, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21520844.2014.883257.
[24] R Allison, “Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis,” International Affairs, 2013, accessed November 4, 2016, at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12046/full.
[25] Shadi Hamid, “Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the Failure of America’s Do-Nothing Policy in the Middle East,” The Atlantic, Octorber 9, 2015, accessed November 8, 2016, at http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egypt-us-policy/409537/
[26] Khashanah, “The Syrian Crisis: A Systemic Framework,” January 2, 2014.
[27] Ibid., 14-15.
[28] Karakoç, “US Policy Towards Syria Since the Early 2000s.”
[29] Khashanah, “The Syrian Crisis: A Systemic Framework,” January 2, 2014.
[30] Mullenbach and Matthews, “Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate Disputes.”
[31] Redd, “The Influence of Advisers and Decision Strategies on Foreign Policy Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo.”
[32] Brulé, “Explaining and Forecasting Leaders’ Decisions: A Poliheuristic Analysis of the Iran Hostage Rescue Decision.”
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